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1.1 Topic of this Thesis 
This thesis covers the possibility of passing a so-called “adequacy decision” on China in 
accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation1 (GDPR) Article 45. This is done by 
conducting an assessment based on the evident legal criteria and the current Chinese data 
protection framework.  
 
1.2 The Relevance of the topic 
The GDPR entered into force on the 25th of May 2018. It replaced the Data Protection Directive 
of 19952 and introduced several changes to EU data protection law, including more stringent 
consent conditions, higher penalties for violations and an expanded territorial scope. In addition 
to providing improved protection for individual’s personal data, the regulation was designed to 
harmonize the data protection rules within the EU as well as modernizing them in order to keep 
up with the present modern digital society.3 A more in-depth review of the GDPR, its provisions 
and its territorial scope will be given in section 2.   
 
This new and comprehensive set of rules implemented through the GDPR received close review 
internationally as data controllers and processors attempted to prepare for these new 
requirements. Due to the expanded territorial scope, the GDPR became applicable outside the 
EU zone in a larger scale than previous EU data protection legislation. This created uncertainty 
and confusion far beyond the borders of the EU. In fact, when the GDPR was implemented in 
May of 2018, several US websites became unavailable to EU users. The organizations behind 
the websites especially feared the fines imposed on breaches of the GDPR, which may be as 
high as 20,000,000 EUR or 4% of a company’s annual turnover.4 This makes GDPR 
compliance ever so relevant. High profile websites including New York Daily News, Chicago 




1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (henceforth GDPR) 
2 Directive 95/46/EC (henceforth Directive 95/46) 
3 GDPR Article 1 
4 GDPR Article 83 
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unavailable. Other major news outlets such as the Washington Post and the Times had EU users 
agree to new terms to guarantee compliance following the implementation.5 
 
Simultaneously, numerous complaints were filed against US tech giants in the EU, accusing 
them of being in breach of the GDPR requirements. Among the accused were important 
companies such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Google and Instagram. The complaints were filed by 
“NOYB”, a non-profit organization led by data protection activist Maximillian Schrems. The 
organization claimed that the companies forced users of their services to consent to data 
processing if they wanted to continue to use the services, in violation of the GDPR Article 7 
(4).6 These complaints showcase how the implementation of the GDPR immediately created 
effects outside the EU.  
 
The upcoming withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, commonly known as Brexit, 
also sheds light on the relevance of this topic. As a result of leaving the EU, the UK will also 
become a third country7 in accordance with the GDPR. They will therefore need an adequacy 
decision in order to exchange personal data on the same terms as the remaining EU countries.8 
  
1.2.1 The importance of an adequacy decision 
Creating a digital “global village”9 consists of a compromise between the protection of personal 
data on one side and information sharing, cross-border business and trade on the other. Through 
the adoption of adequacy decisions, the EU attempts to ensure that the stringent personal data 
protection rules within the EU follow the data when it is transferred to a third country. This is 




5 BBC News, “GDPR: US news unavailable to EU users under new rules” 
6 NOYB (2018) 
7 Any country or territory outside of the EU/EEA. (The European Economic Area (EEA): an agreement between 
the EU, its Member States and the three EFTA-countries Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland. It extends the EU’s 
single market to also include these three countries.) 
8 ICO, Denham (2019); 
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has expressed that obtaining an adequacy decision after Brexit is 
the plan. This will however take a couple months at minimum as the adequacy assessment is unable to start 
before the UK leaves the EU and officially become a third country. The ICO has therefore issued several 
guidelines for smaller and bigger companies to maintain GDPR compliance when Brexit becomes reality.  
9 “Global village” was a term introduced by Herbert Marshall McLuhan in his 1960s works. The term is used to 
describe a world becoming interconnected by the means of media and technology. Cambridge Dictionary defines 
#the global village” as “countries being closely connected by modern technology and trade”.  
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and its institutions to collaborate outside the Union regarding investigations and cross boarder 
crime, which is essential in an increasingly digital society.  
 
Without an adequacy decision, third countries and organizations are unable to benefit from the 
free flow of data. In order to transfer personal data lawfully without an adequacy decision, 
organizations will have to apply alternative tools for transfers in accordance the GDPR Chapter 
5, which involves more complicated and cumbersome processes. Ultimately, an adequacy 
decision intertwines the country or territory in question to the free flow data market within the 
EU-zone.   
 
1.2.2 The relevance of an adequacy decision with China  
As this thesis aims to account the possibility of an adequacy decision with China, it is important 
to understand why this in particularly would be beneficial. As already stated, the territorial 
scope of the GDPR expands outside EU borders. This forces institutions and companies outside 
the EU area to comply with the rules of the GDPR, if the specified requirements mentioned 
under subsection 2.2 are met.  
 
With China being one of the largest economies in the world, an adequacy decision on China 
would make trade and other cross-border commerce more efficient. In fact, the EU is the biggest 
trading partner of China, and China the second biggest of the EU, only succeeded by the United 
States of America (US). The average daily trade between China and the EU is estimated to be 
1 billion EURO according to the European Commission (the Commission).10 The amount of 
trade and commerce with China further amplifies the need for an adequacy decision. 
 
This would ease the personal data exchange of international companies with branches in both 
the EU and China, or Chinese companies who for example wish to offer their services though 
an app targeting EU residents. The absolute simplest, cheapest and least time-consuming way 






10 EC, “China” 
 4 
 
1.3 Methodology and legal sources 
As this thesis is based on a GDPR provision, which is an EU regulation, and it is within the 
GDPR the legal basis for adequacy decisions are found, the thesis statement will be based on 
EU legal method. EU law is an autonomous legal system and there is a specific EU legal method 
to be applied while assessing legal issues within this jurisdiction. This method is established by 
the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), who also have the exclusive 
right to interpret EU legislation. The main traits of this method are that the interpretation shall 
be in conformity with the wording of the provisions and stay true to the relevant objections. 
The CJEU has concluded that “in order to determine the scope of a provision of EU law, its 
wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account”.11  
 
EU legislation will be used to establish the legal framework of EU data protection law, most 
importantly the GDPR, Directive 95/46 and the already existing acts on adequacy decisions 
passed by the Commission. The decision on Japan12 will be particularly in focus as it is the one 
most recently adopted as well as the only one with its legal basis in the GDPR. In addition to 
the Commission acts implementing adequacy decisions, other Commission soft law such as 
press releases and guidelines are used as they impact the policy development and practice.13 
The official Commission website will also be used as a reference as it expressed the official 
opinion of the Commission. Although it is not an official legal source, the information 
expressed on the website will be of relevance as the Commission is the institution conducting 
the adequacy assessments and implementing the decisions.  
 
Judgements from the CJEU will be used to clarify the matter substance of the GDPR Article 
45. As the GDPR is still relatively new, most judgments concerning adequacy decisions are 
based on the previous legal basis for adequacy decisions in Article 35 (6) of Directive 95/94, 
which contained the corresponding term “adequate level of protection”. As this provision has 
been carried on from Directive 95/46 to the GDPR, the judgements are still applicable to 
interpret the current provisions. Despite the Commission being the executive power within the 




11 Azevedo and Others, C-558/15, para. 19. 
12 (EU) 2019/419 
13 Soft law is used to describe opinions, guidelines, declarations etc. that are not legally binding as opposed to 
hard law which refers to legally enforceable obligations such as legal acts, regulations, directives and decisions.   
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Guidelines and other documents issued by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) are 
also of relevance in order to assess the data adequacy situation in China. The EDPB is 
responsible for ensuring “the consistent application of the Regulation” in accordance with the 
GDPR Article 70 (1). This includes making sure data protection law is applied consistently 
throughout the EU, ensure cooperation between the national Data Protection Authorities, issue 
guidelines on the interpretation of the GDPR and to issue binding decisions in cases of cross 
border processing disputes. Ultimately, the task of the EDPB is to ensure conformity across the 
EU under the rule of the GDPR. They issue documents essential to understanding the 
interpretation of the GDPR provisions, including elements of particular importance in regard to 
adequacy assessments. Also, documents issued by the EDPB’s predecessor, Article 29 Working 
Party (WP 29) are good references for clarification and summaries of the prevailing law based 
on relevant case law, procedure and internal instructions.  
 
The EDPB is to act independently and without taking instructions but does nevertheless have 
an advisory role towards the Commission. In addition to examining any question concerning 
the application of the GDPR on its own initiative, this should also be done on request from 
members of the Commission. The EDPB is also to advise the Commission on any issue 
regarding data protection within the EU, on any proposed amendment to the GDPR. More 
important for the assessment of data adequacy, the EDPB is required to provide the Commission 
an opinion regarding the adequate level of protection in a third country during such a process.14  
This proves the importance of EDPB sources for this thesis regardless of the limited legal 
weight.  
 
Concerning the Chinese legal framework, the most important regulations are the Cybersecurity 
Law (CSL) and the Information Security Technology - Personal Information Security 
Specification (the Standard). The CLS is a formally enacted law, while the Standard is a set of 
voluntary guidelines. They are however adopted pursuant to the CSL, and its provisions are 
regarded as an extension of the cybersecurity system set out by the CSL. The Standard 
accordingly intends to provide a more in-depth and detailed understanding of the personal data 
legal framework. They will be used intertwined to give an image of the Chinese data protection 




14 EDPB, “Role of the EDPB” 
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For all EU sources, the official English version will be used. In absence of official English 
translations, unofficial translations of the Chinese legislation will be used. The translations are 
necessary as I am not proficient in Chinese and therefore not able to use the official Chinese 
versions for the assessment.  
 
1.4 The relevant notions 
This section will briefly specify some of the relevant notions that will be used in the thesis. As 
the Chinese framework does not operate with the equivalent terms as the GDPR, it is necessary 
to establish the differences and/or similarities to avoid ambiguity in the further portrayal.  
 
1.4.1 Personal data 
The definition of “personal data” is given in GDPR Article 4 (1). It states that “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person [data subject]” is included. It further 
specifies information such as “names, dates of birth, identity card number, biometric 
information, addresses, telecommunication contract methods, communication records and 
contents, account passwords, property information, credit information, location data, 
accommodation information, health and physiological information, transaction data, etc.” as 
elements to consider particularly, although this list is not meant to be exhaustive.15 
 
In contrast the Standard use the term “personal information”, which is defined as “All kinds of 
information, recorded by electronic or other methods, that can be used, alone or combined with 
other information, to identify a specific natural person or reflect activities of a specific natural 
person”.16  
 
Both frameworks give a clear definition of what is regarded as respectively “personal data” in 
the GDPR and “personal information” in the Standard. The two definitions are not identical, 
but the intentions of the two do however correspond to a large extent. The essence of both 
definitions seems to be the possibility of identification, either by the concrete data itself or 




15 GDPR Article 4 (1) 
16 The Standard Article 3.1 
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GDPR’s term “personal data” will be used throughout the thesis to cover both definitions.  
 
1.4.2 Processing of personal data 
The term “processing” will be used for operations performed on personal data, automated or 
not, including collection, storage, recording etc., in accordance with the GDPR Article 4 (2). In 
the introduction of the Standard it is stated that its purpose is to regulate behavior related to 
“information processing such as collection, retention, use, sharing, transfer, and public 
disclosure”.17 The term processing is furthermore used frequently in the provisions of the 
Standard in addition to in Chapter IV of the CSL, suggesting a corresponding meaning in the 
Chinese framework. An example of processing would be storing the IP address of people 
visiting your website.  
 
1.4.3 Controller 
The GDPR defines a controller as a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purpose and means of the processing 
of personal data”.18 In the Chinese framework, the term “Personal Information Controller” is 
used, which is defined as “an organization or individual that has the authority to determine the 
purpose and/or methods of processing PI [personal information]”.19 Summarized by these 
definitions, a controller will be any individual, company or organization determining how and 
when personal data is to be processed. This may for example be a company collecting personal 
data from their employees. 
 
1.4.4 Processor 
A processor is defined in the GDPR as “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller”.20 These organizations 
process personal data on behalf of a controller but are nevertheless required to ensure GDPR 
compliance. A typical example of a data processor is when companies offer IT services such as 





17 The Standard - Introduction 
18 GDPR Article 4 (7) 
19 The Standard Article 3.4 
20 GDPR Article 4 (8) 
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The Chinese framework does not operate with a concurrent term. All requirements are directed 
at controllers because they are the ultimate responsible party to ensure data protection. Because 
there is no definition, the presumption is that processors are not subject to the Standard. The 
fact that processors are not defined does however not mean that the Standard excludes the use 
of third parties conducting such tasks. Controllers deciding to use third parties for processor-
activities in China will however have to pay more attention to who they enter into contract with 
as they will be held responsible for lack of compliance.  
 
1.4.5 Transfer to third country 
An adequacy decision is a way of safeguarding the transfer of data to a third country, which 
makes it relevant to clarify this term. The term refers to the transfer of personal data currently 
undergoing processing or intended for processing in the third country. It is not a requirement 
that the data is transferred physically to the third country. The fact that a subject in a third 
country can access a server containing the personal data, even if this server is placed within the 
EU, is enough for a transfer of data to have occurred in accordance with the GDPR. It will also 
be considered a transfer where a subsidiary company located within the EU transfers personal 
data to a parent company located in a third country21. An example would be if an EU company 
that offers trips to China provided the costumer’s booking information (including details such 
as names, passport information, social security number, date of births, etc.) on to the hotel in 
China. Such a transfer can only take place in the event of an adequacy decision or other 
safeguards in accordance with the GDPR for the transfer to be legal.  
 
Information on a website that is based within the EU, but makes the information available to 
third parties in third countries, will not be regarded as a transfer in accordance with the 
Lindqvist-judgement.22 Neither will the routing of personal data between two EU countries (or 
a third country with data adequacy) through a server in a third country, if the personal data in 
question is not intended to be accessed in the third country. This is categorized as “transit” and 






21 Udsen, (2019), p. 436-438  




The GDPR defines a recipient as any “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
another body, to which the personal data are disclosed” in Article 4 (9). Whether this is a third 
party or not is insignificant. The provision does contain an exception for public authorities 
receiving personal data in accordance with EU or national law, but this exception will not be 
addressed further. The term is neither defined in the CSL nor the Standard yet is referred to in 
several provisions. For example, controllers are to “notify recipients to delete the information” 
in the event of unlawful disclosure of personal data.23 Although the term in not explicitly 
defined, the way it is used in the provisions of the Standard indicates a similar meaning as that 
of the GDPR, that being someone who has received the relevant personal data in question.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
In the following segment there will be three main sections. The first will give a brief and general 
introduction to the GDPR and its objectives, as well as a short introduction to the territorial 
scope, with focus on how and when the regulation becomes applicable for entities located in 
third countries such as China.   
 
Secondly, there will be given an introduction to the concept of an adequacy decision as well as 
the procedure and legal criteria required for the Commission to implement such an act. The 
most recent adequacy decision adopted on Japan will be used as a reference to see how an 
adequacy assessment is conducted in practice.  
 
In the third section contains the main portion of the thesis, which will provide an attempt to 
form a picture of the current status of data adequacy in China by looking at some of the central 
provisions in the legal framework, in addition to enforcement and supervision mechanisms. 
Some of the differences between the Chinese framework and the GDPR will also be 







23 The Standard Article 7 (6) c) 
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1.6 Limitations  
The thesis will be limited to adequacy decisions in GDPR Article 45, meaning that other 
provisions of transfers to third countries in the GDPR will be excluded. A short section 
elucidating the criteria for application based on GDPR Article 3 (2) will also be included, but 
an in-depth analysis of the territorial scope will not be conducted due to the nature of the 
topic.  
  
As an assessment leading up to an adequacy decision is very extensive and time consuming, 
and demanding a high level of expertise of which I do not hold, the thesis will be limited to an 
assessment of the possibility of an adequacy decision, not an attempt to conduct the actual 
adequacy assessment required by Article 45 of the GDPR. The thesis aims to present the legal 
criteria for adequacy decision and to present some important observations regarding the Chinese 
data protection framework in relation to these criteria, in order to consider the possibilities of 
an adoption of an adequacy decision.  
 




















2. The GDPR 
 
2.1 An introduction to the GDPR 
The GDPR entered into force on the 25th of May 2018, replacing the Data Protection Directive 
95/46. It provides one of the most extensive personal data protection laws in the world and 
makes up the core of the EU data protection legislation (also including the three EFTA states 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein).24 In order to safeguard that the level of protection 
guaranteed by the GDPR travels with the personal data when it is transferred outside of the EU, 
the GDPR also contains different mechanisms for safely transferring personal data to third 
countries. Chapter 5 of the GDPR contains the tools that can be used to execute third country 
transfers, including the legal basis of adequacy decisions. 
 
The objectives of the GDPR are emphasized in Article 1, including the protection of the 
processing of natural persons’ personal data and the free movement of personal data within the 
EU. In short, the GDPR seeks to implement a market permitting free flow of personal data 
while also providing safe and lawful processing where the data subjects´ personal data and other 
rights are adequately protected.25 
 
2.2. The territorial scope of the GDPR 
As the GDPR extends its territorial scope for specified processing activities, it is important to 
understand how and when the regulation is applicable for anyone outside the EU, including 
organizations based in China.   
 
As previously stated, the GDPR contains a broader scope of application than that of Directive 
95/46. There was made an effort to clarify the scope of application as the previous provision 
was vague and left room for confusion and misinterpretation. The GDPR clarifies the 





24 GDPR was incorporated into the EEA Agreement by the EEA Joint Committee on 6 July 2018 through the 
adoption of a Joint Committee Decision 154/2018 para. 10; The GDPR was incorporated into Norwegian law 
pursuant to Personopplysningsloven of 15 June 2018 number 38. 
25 GDPR Article 1 
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One reason behind the extended territorial scope is the fact that the GDPR was passed as a 
regulation, as opposed to a directive such as the previous data protection legislation. While the 
content of Directive 95/46 could be interpreted differently in the various member states due to 
its nature as a directive, the provisions of the GDPR are directly applicable in its entirety 
throughout the EU due to its position as a regulation.26 One of the thoughts behind establishing 
the new provisions in a regulation was to diminish the national differences leading to legal 
uncertainty and lack of coherency throughout the Union under Directive 95/46. In fact, in the 
proposition of the GDPR it was emphasized that “the EU needs a more comprehensive and 
coherent policy on the fundamental right to personal data protection”.27 
 
The territorial scope of the GDPR appear in Article 3. The first paragraph sets out the standard 
territorial scope, stating that the GDPR is applicable for “processing of personal data in the 
context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union”.28 
Paragraph two further broadens the territorial scope as it makes the GDPR applicable outside 
the EU territorial jurisdiction if specified criteria are met. The third being application to 
controllers located outside the EU where member state law is applicable by virtue of 
international law.29 In connection with application for Chinese organizations, Article 3 (2) is 
the obvious legal basis, thus making this paragraph the focus in the following presentation. 
 
2.2.1 The criteria of Article 3 (2)  
Article 3 (2) sounds as follows: 
 
“2. This regulation applies to the processing of personal data subjects who are in the Union by 
a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related 
to: 
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is 
required, to such data subjects in the Union; or 





26 TFEU Article 288 
27 COM/2012/011 final p. 2  
28 GDPR Article 3 (1) 
29 Ibid. Article 3 (3) 
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By way of introduction, it is worth to mention that the targeting criterion applies to all natural 
persons staying within the EU zone, regardless of their nationality or official place of 
residence.30 For example, this means that the GDPR will be applicable to any Chinese based 
data controllers processing information or offering services to Chinese nationals as long as they 
are residing within the EU. The application of the GDPR cannot be avoided due to the fact that 
the personal data belongs to Chinese nationals, for example. This will also be the outcome 
regardless if the persons in question are staying within the EU short term i.e. on vacation or a 
business trip. Seen in correlation with Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, this 
corresponds with the evident principle assuring the right of data protection to “anyone”, not just 
EU citizens. The GDPR should be interpreted in accordance with the Charter due to its position 
as primary EU law.31 The point of intersection of relevance will be the location of the 
individual(s) at the time when the relevant trigger activity takes place.32 
 
Yet, the EDPB has stated that processing in itself is not sufficient in order for the GDPR to be 
applied if the controller or processer is established outside the EU. It is also required that the 
element of “targeting” persons within the EU must be present. As articulated in Article 3 (2) 
b), this element can be present either through the offering of goods or services, or through 
monitoring behavior.  
 
An example of offering goods or services could be a Chinese based company selling products 
that are made available for sale within the EU, offering payment in currencies such as EURO 
and GBP, being available in EU languages such as English, French and German, offering 
shipping to European countries and so forth. A practical example of application through 
monitoring behavior would be when a Chinese based company has an app that processes 
location data of the costumers while specifically targeting the EU market.  
 
This thesis will not complete a full assessment of these criteria as this is extensive and outside 
the scope of the thesis. The core of Article 3 (2) is that companies located within China or any 




30 Confirmed by GDPR Recital 14 
31 Lenaerts and van Nuffel (2011), p. 831-832 
32 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018 p. 13 
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3. Adequacy decisions 
 
An adequacy decision is an implementing act by the Commission which confirms that third 
countries, territories, specific sectors in third countries or organizations provide the same level 
of data protection as within the EU zone.33 The effect of an adequacy decision is that personal 
data can flow freely between the EU and the third country or organization in question, without 
the need of any additional authorization.34 This reduces the workload affiliated with third 
country transfers, by, among other things simplifying the regulatory environment for 
international business. However, these decisions do not however cover the exchange of data in 
the law enforcement sector, such as data governed by the so-called “Police Directive”.35 
 
The legal basis of adequacy decisions is the GDPR Article 45, stating that such a decision “may 
take place where the Commission has decided” that the country in question “ensures an 
adequate level of protection”, see Article 45 (1). Paragraph 2 of Article 45 further specifies the 
elements the Commission shall take into consideration when assessing the adequacy level of 
the country or organization in question, hence what is needed to satisfy the criteria of “adequate 
level of protection” in Article 45. 
 
To this date (December of 2019), the Commission has adopted adequacy decision with respect 
to Andorra36, Argentina37, the Faroe Islands38, Guernsey39, Israel40, Isle of Man41, Japan42, 




33 GDPR Article 45 (1) 
34 EC, “Adequacy decisions” 
35 Directive (EU) 2016/680 Article 36 
36 2010/625/EU      
37 2003/490/EC 
38 2010/146/EU 
39 2003/821/EC     
40 2011/61/EU 
41 2004/411/EC 
42 (EU) 2019/419 
43 2008/393/EC     
44 2013/65/EU 





and the United States48, although neither is of full value adequacy decisions. Both are limited 
to more precisely demarcated companies who meet given data protection criteria.49   
 
3.1 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner 
This concept of “adequate level of protection”, which already existed under Directive 95/46, 
has been further developed by the CJEU. The current legal standard of the adequacy term was 
set by the CJEU in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.50 The judgement concerned a 
complaint by Maximilliam Schrems against the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, 
concerning the former adequacy decision on the US, called “Safe Harbor”. He argued that the 
United States did not offer an adequate level of data protection in light of the revelations made 
by Edward Snowden in 2013, revealing that the United States did not offer adequate protection 
against surveillance by public authorities. According to Schrems, the transfer of personal data 
by Facebook Ireland to servers located in the United States for processing were consequently 
unlawful. The Irish Data Protection Commissioner rejected the complaint, whilst the Irish High 
Court heard the case, but decided to stay the proceedings and refer the case to the CJEU. The 
CJEU ultimately held that the Safe Harbor agreement enabling transfers of personal data 
between the EU and the United States was invalid. The judgement was based on the grounds 
that the agreement permitted public authorities to have access to personal data on a general 
basis, which undermined the fundamental right to respect for private life assured by the EU 
Charter Article 7. Based on this, the CJEU held that the decision did not offer an adequate level 
of protection as the Commission had failed to prove that “the United States in fact ‘ensures’ an 
adequacy level of protection by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments”, 
as was required by Directive 95/46 Article 25(6).51  
 
The CJEU went on to clarify the legal standard of data adequacy, stating that the level of 
protection in the third country had to be "essentially equivalent" to that guaranteed in the EU. 
Furthermore, the court stated that "the means to which that third country has recourse, in this 




48 (EU) 2016/1250                  
49 EC, “Adequacy decisions” 
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the [EU]"52. Consequently, it was clarified that the personal data framework did not necessarily 
have to mirror the European legislation point by point, but an adequacy decision had to establish 
that the essential core requirements of the data protection legislation was adequate.53  
 
3.2 The procedure for the adoption of an adequacy decision 
The procedure to be followed in order to adopt an adequacy decision in accordance with Article 
45 is a four-step process. It starts with a proposal from the Commission, followed by an opinion 
by the European Data Protection Board, and subsequently an approval from the EU countries’ 
representatives. Finally, the decision has to be adopted by the Commission.54   
 
Before an adequacy decision can be passed, a comprehensive assessment of the adequacy level 
is required. This includes an evaluation of the legislation in place to protect the personal data 
and regulate the data processing, the extent of oversight mechanisms as well as the level of 
compliance and implementation in practice.55 In addition, the assessment includes a review of 
the limitations and protection that are applied in order for personal data to become available to 
local and government authorities.56 
 
At any point in this process, the European Parliament or the Council may request an amendment 
or withdrawal of the adequacy decision on the basis that it exceeds the implementing powers 
provided by the GDPR. The Commission has a duty to “repeal, amend or suspend the decision” 
see the GDPR 45 (5). The EDPB also has a supervisory function in relation to the adequacy 
assessment. One of the relevant tasks is to provide an opinion to the Commission “assessing 
whether a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country; 
or an international organisation no longer ensures an adequate level of protection”.57 
The CJEU can also review this process and stop it at any time. This power is not limited to the 
time leading up to the adoption of an adequacy decision, but also extends to the time after a 
decision has been implemented. An example is when the CJEU found the former data transfer 




52 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, paras. 73 and 74 
53 WP 254 rev.01 Chapter 1 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.  
56 GDPR Article 45 (2) (b) 
57 Ibid. Article 70 (1) (s) 
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Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.58 As mentioned in the previous section, the CJEU 
found that the Safe Harbor decision failed to “comply with the requirements laid down in 
Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46”.59 This action was taken 15 years after the introduction of the 
Safe Harbor Agreement.   
 
Once an adequacy decision has been passed and implemented, the effect is that personal data 
can be transferred to the third country, sector or organization as if the data was transferred 
within the EU. Adequacy decisions will however not be upheld indefinitely. They are to be 
subject to a “periodic review, at least every four years”.60 The decisions need to be closely 
monitored as there might occur developments which will affect the level of protection ensured 
in the third country.61 Specific incidents or special arrangements may require reviews at a more 
rapid rate than the main rule of four years. An example of this is the Privacy Shield agreement 
with the United States which is subject to annual review.62  
 
3.2.1 The legal criteria  
The following paragraph contains a closer look at the legal criteria that needs to be met in order 
to bring about an adequacy decision. The legal basis, Article 45 (1) and (2) of the GDPR sounds 
as follows: 
 
“1. A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take place 
where the Commission has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more specified 
sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an 
adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall not require any specific authorisation. 
2. When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission shall, in particular, 
take account of the following elements: 
(a) the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, 
both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, national 
security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal data, as well 
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60 GDPR Article 45 (3) 
61 Ibid. Article 45 (3) and (4) 




security measures, including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to another 
third country or international organisation which are complied with in that country or 
international organisation, case-law, as well as effective and enforceable data subject 
rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose 
personal data are being transferred; 
(b) the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory 
authorities in the third country or to which an international organisation is subject, with 
responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules, 
including adequate enforcement powers, for assisting and advising the date subjects in 
exercising their rights and for cooperating with the supervisory authorities of the 
Member States; and 
(c) the international commitments the third country or international organisation concerned 
has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or 
instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in 
particular in relation to the protection of personal data.” 
 
Summarized; an adequacy decision may only find place when there is “an adequate level of 
protection” in accordance with paragraph 1. The Commission shall particularly take into 
consideration three key elements; (a) the state of data protection law in the country, including 
how it is enforced and redress of data subjects, (b) whether there are functioning and 
independent supervisory authorities responsible for the compliance of the legislation mentioned 
in (a), and (c) international commitments or other legally binding obligations. The assessment 
is virtually a two-step assessment: it requires an analysis of the content of rules that are 
applicable within the country in question, as well as the means in place to ensure an effective 
application of these rules. 
 
The Commission has also found that the extent of the EU’s commercial relationship with the 
country, the extent of personal data flow to the country, the pioneering role the third country 
plays in this field and the overall political relationship with the country shall be taking into 
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In order for data adequacy to exist with a third country, complete resemblance to the EU rules 
or system is not required. In accordance with the CJEU’s judgement in Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner, the level of protection ensured for personal data in the country in 
question must be “essentially equivalent”.64 The adequacy assessment includes several different 
factors that are tailored against an overall assessment of each individual case.  
 
3.2.2 The procedure used in the adequacy decision with Japan 
The adequacy decision on Japan was adopted on 23rd of January 2019, resulting in the creation 
of the largest area of safe data flow in the world.65 Alongside the adequacy decision adopted by 
the Commission, a corresponding decision was adopted in Japan.66 President Juncker of the 
Commission and Prime Minister Abe of Japan publicly committed to adopting an adequacy 
decision as early as in July of 2017.67 The talks were concluded roughly one year later.68 What 
makes the decision on Japan important, is that this was the first adequacy decision to be adopted 
after the implementation of the GDPR. It correspondingly sets a standard for how future 
adequacy assessments will be conducted.  
 
To start the procedure, the Commission developed a draft Decision, which both The European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the EDPB 
gave their response on. The resolution adopted by LIBE contained several criticisms of the draft 
decision.69 The criticism consisted of twelve main points. It included the lack of sufficient 
clarification regarding the type of EU personal data covered by the adequacy decision, the 
independence of the Personal Information Protection Commission of Japan (PPC), insufficient 
levels of fines, the opportunity for business operators to voluntarily hand over data to law 
enforcement, and Japanese mass surveillance.70 Shortly summarized, LIBE did not find that the 
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The EDPB gave an Opinion on the draft decision following a plenary session in December 
2018. This opinion also contained criticism of the draft for not proving adequacy.71 It was also 
expressed that as this was the first adequacy decision to be adopted after the GDPR came into 
force, the decisions would be “of paramount importance [because] it will set a precedent”.72 
Meaning the EDPB acknowledged how the procedure and content of this decision would be 
used as a reference in any future adequacy assessment.  
 
As a part of the work to conclude an adequacy decision, Japan agreed to revise and update its 
data protection laws in order to meet the comprehensive rules set forward by the GDPR. This 
was proven necessary based on the feedback given by LIBE and EDPB. These updates included 
implementing stricter provisions for re-transferring personal data that originated from the EU, 
stricter provisions for processing of sensitive data and enabled a new mechanism allowing EU 
citizens to file complaints against the Japanese data protection authorities if their personal data 
is unlawfully processed. These changes all went into effect as the adequacy decision was 
adopted.73   
 
This past subsection aims to create a picture of the adequacy decision process, but also to 
illustrate how the adoption of an adequacy decision is a step-by-step procedure which develops 
over time. The third country is not required to have “essentially equivalent” data protection 
frameworks once talks concerning adequacy decisions have started. This is the level of 
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4. Data Adequacy and China 
 
This section will provide a review of the Chinese data protection framework compared to 
some of the important elements of the GDPR. The segment will take a look at some of the 
main differences and similarities of the two frameworks and attempt to evaluate the 
consequences this will have for the possibility of a future adequacy decision.  
 
4.1 An introduction to Chinese data protection law 
Data protection law in China is a relatively new concept compared to most EU countries. As 
with many concepts in China, the field of data protection law has been subject to a rapid 
development, unlike the EU, where the development has come about gradually over a longer 
period of time. Prior to the implementation of the CSL in June of 2017, there was in fact no 
data protection law in China. The different provisions that did exist were scattered around in 
different laws and regulations, and mostly focused on system and infrastructure security as 
opposed to personal data.  
 
The drafting of the CSL started in 2015, and the need for personal data protection legislation 
became evident soon after. During the summer of 2016, two students died in a matter of days 
due to heart attacks as a result of their personal data being misused to commit fraud, causing 
them to lose their tuition money. Their deaths sparked public outrage and showed a dangerous 
downside for the lack of personal data protection legislation in China. In the wake of these 
events and the need to keep up with the global development of the field, the CSL was adopted 
and came into effect roughly a year later.74 
 
The data protection framework in China still consist of a complex framework with several laws 
and regulations, in addition to many different governmental administrators and committees.75 
With the vast amount of regulations and involved institutions, the system can be difficult to 
follow at times. This poses a threat to the legal certainty or so-called predictability of the 
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4.1.1 The Chinese Cybersecurity Law 
The CSL is a comprehensive piece of legislation. In addition to regulating the protection of 
personal data and restricting the onwards transfer, it also includes penalties such as the 
suspension of business activities, fines and the revocation of licensing and other sanctions for 
neglecting to accommodate to the provisions.76 Consequently, it is not a pure personal data 
protection regulation in the sense of the GDPR. Chapter 4, which is titled “Network Information 
Security” focuses on protecting personal data and will correspondingly be the most relevant 
section in regard to the adequacy assessment. It is worth to mention that CSL only applies to 
“network operators”. This term is commonly used for organizations providing network services 
in digital form. Thus, will the protection of the CSL only extend to the personal data of network 
users.77 Personal data stored in any non-digital item such as for example paper, will not be 
protected under this law.78  
 
4.1.2 The Standard 
The Standard79 was issued in of December 2017 by the Standardization Administration of the 
People’s Republic of China (SAC), coming into effect just a couple of weeks before the GDPR 
in May 2018. The development of the Standard came as a result of joint work by the 
government, industries as well as academics. It sets out a full set of voluntary guidelines relating 
to the processing of personal data. Although it is not a legally binding regulation, it is a 
respected national standard under the system of the CSL. Its legal status can be compared to 
soft law within the EU. 
 
As previously stated, the Standard is not legally binding, meaning it cannot be legally enforced. 
This weakens its legal position and influence in relation to the adequacy assessment. Despite 
this, the Chinese government has since its release used it as a reference to point at shortcomings 
and data protection issues in several big companies who were not in compliance with its 
guidelines. This shows that despite its voluntary nature the Standard has legal force through the 
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For example, in January 2018 Ant Financial was criticized after it became evident that the 
company automatically enrolled users of their services to a credit scoring by a third party after 
paying on the website. In response to the public outrage, the CAC interviewed both Ant 
Financial and the third part Sesame Credit.80 An interview meaning a summoning by the 
relevant authority to converse and point out serious violations of laws and regulations and issue 
orders of rectification and correction. This shows that even though the Standard has limited 
legal impact in theory, it is still used to hold companies accountable and make them comply 
with its norms.81  
 
Two other major companies, Baidu and Beijing ByteDance Technology have also been 
reprimanded for not informing their users that their personal data was used and how it was 
processed. Three additional companies were given instruction to immediately improve and 
correct their privacy policy in order to protect their users’ personal data privacy rights and 
interests. If these companies failed to correct, they would face administrative punishment.82 
This further legitimizes the provisions of the Standard through the enforcement by CAC.   
 
The above-mentioned examples show that the Standard and its provisions have been enforced 
by CAC regardless of its voluntary nature. It is also clear that organizations following the 
guidelines of the Standard will gain credibility amongst its customers and the general public 
because it shows that the company is taking data protection issues seriously. This gives a 
stronger incentive to implement these provisions, even if they are not legally obliged to do so.  
 
Together with the CSL, the Standard constitutes the core of the Chinese data protection 
framework, and thus will be used in the following assessment.  
 
4.2 How the Chinese framework measures to the GDPR 
The WP 29 has summarized some key content principles that need to exist in a third country in 
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held up against some of these principles. This section will highlight some of the similarities and 
differences of the Chinese framework and the GDPR and take a look at observations that would 
be taken into consideration by the Commission in an adequacy assessment.83 
 
By way of introduction, there are several evident similarities between the Chinese framework 
and the GDPR. They both aim for purpose limitation, data minimization, transparency, security, 
confidentiality and integrity in data processing, as well as both containing accountability 
principles for controllers.84 In addition, the scope of application of both the GDPR and the 
Standard covers both the private and the public sector.85 Such similarities lay the foundation 
for further work towards an adequacy decision.   
 
4.2.1 Concepts 
Basic concepts of data protection not necessarily mirroring, but at least consistent with the 
concepts of the GDPR are required for a country to have an adequate level of protection. As 
mentioned in subsection 1.4; concepts corresponding to “personal data”, “processing” and 
“controller” are found in the Chinese framework. The term “processor” and “recipient” are 
not defined, but without being conclusive in regard to the adequacy assessment as mentioned 
in subsections 1.4.4 and 1.4.5. The term “sensitive data” does however require some further 
clarification.86  
 
The Standard operates with the term “Personal Sensitive Information”, which presumes to be 
in concurrence with “special categories of personal data” in the GDPR87 For future reference, 
the term “sensitive data” will be used as this is utilized by WP29. The scope of sensitive 
information in the Standard seems to be more far-reaching than the corresponding term of the 
GDPR Article 9 (1). In addition to racial origin, generic data, biometric data, health data and 
data regarding one’s sexual orientation, which is also included in the GDPR, the Standard 
includes identity card number, bank account number, telephone number, email address, geo-
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what might be counted as sensitive information, the Standard has included a broad and non-
exhaustive list, including six categories and over fifty examples.  
 
In addition, any personal data about a person under the age of 14 is also rendered as sensitive 
data in the Chinese system.88 In fact, new provisions dedicated to protecting children’s personal 
data came into effect in China on 1st of October 2019. It only governs storage within China, but 
contains strict provisions regarding consent and restricted internal access to this type of data, 
these guidelines represent an effort to strengthen the protection of sensitive personal data.89 The 
GDPR on the other hand, requires guardians to consent to processing of personal data of 
children under the age of 16, but does not automatically consider this sensitive data.90   
 
This indicates that we find many of the basic data protection concepts of the GDPR in the 
Chinese framework. They are not identical, which this is not required as long as they are 
somewhat consistent with those of EU law. As to the fact that sensitive data is defined much 
wider in China indicates that the concepts are not consistent with the concepts of the GDPR. 
On the other hand, the more far- reaching scope makes it harder for organizations to evade the 
special requirements applied to the processing of sensitive data. Consequently, the Chinese 
framework help ensure better data protection when it comes to processing their sensitive data. 
This complies with the objective of the GDPR to protect the personal data of natural persons in 
Article 1.  
 
4.2.2 Grounds for lawful processing  
The CSL enables processing of personal data when the data subject has consented, meaning 
processing without consent to be unlawful.91 The GDPR on the other hand presents six 
alternative grounds for lawful processing, consent being only one of them. The remaining 
grounds being processing necessary for the performance of a contract, compliance with legal 
obligation, protection of vital interests, public interest or legitimate interests.92 These alternative 
grounds are included in the GDPR as the requirements for consent will sometimes not be 
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request to be given in a distinguishable context, the possibility to withdraw the consent and that 
the consent is not given as a condition for performance of a contract where the processing is 
not necessary.93 The essence of this provision is that consent must be given freely which can 
only occur if the data subject has a genuine choice on whether or not to consent and is fully 
informed about what he or she is consenting to. The reasoning behind this is to protect data 
subjects from being coerced into consenting to processing due to external factors. With consent 
being the only lawful form of processing in the Chinese framework, this may pose a problem 
in relation to the adequacy assessment seeing as these considerations are not addressed.  
 
Furthermore, the Chinese framework operates with two different types of concept, explicit and 
implied. Specified provision in the Standard requires explicit consent by the date subject, 
including processing of sensitive data. Antithetical, this indicates that remaining provisions 
without this specification only requires implied consent in order to be lawful.  The concept of 
implied consent does not exist in the GDPR.  
 
The problem with implied consent is that it can be hard to prove that consent is given and that 
the data subject was fully aware of what him/her was consenting to. This further provides 
companies with a margin for stretching consent when it hasn’t necessarily been given or when 
the data subject has not properly understood what he/she has consented to. Allowing implied 
consent as a legal basis for data processing is undermines the data processors’ rights by not 
allowing them a legitimate choice for consent. Accordingly do the Standard not offer the same 
level of protection as the GDPR in relation to consent. This indicates that the grounds for lawful 
processing in the Chinese framework are not essentially equivalent to that of the GDPR. 94  
 
A similarity is that both the GDPR and the Standard permits processing of personal data with 
exceptions from the provisions of lawful purpose for processing. The GDPR Article 23 enables 
such processing in cases where it is necessary to safeguard the national security and defense, 
necessary in the public interest, compliance with legal obligations, to protect the vital interest 
of the data subject or another person, or if it is necessary for the performance of a contract 
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necessary in order to fulfill a contract and directly related to national security or defense, among 
other things.95    
 
4.2.3 The right of access, rectification, erasure and objection 
Other important principles like the right of access, rectification, erasure and objection are 
important to establish in the Chinese framework in order for an adequacy decision to be a 
possibility.96 The Standard assures data subject’s right to rectification and erasure in accordance 
with Articles 7.5 and 7.6. Although the right to objection is not explicitly mentioned, there are 
provisions requiring data controllers to offer means for data subjects to lodge complaints, as 
well as to respond to these within reasonable time, see Articles 7.10 and 7.12. This indicates 
that the right of objection is also present in the Chinese framework. 
 
When it comes to the right of access, Article 7 (4) and 7 (9) of the Standard require controllers 
to provide access and copies of specified categories of personal data upon the data subjects 
request. Copies are to be provided of “basic information and information about their identities” 
as well as “health, psychological, educational and work information”.97 In accordance with the 
GDPR, the right of data subject to request copies of all personal data processed is a key 
principle, making restricted access in accordance with the Chinese framework problematic in 
relation to a possible adequacy decision. A practical example of this right being asking a social 
media provider where you have a profile for a copy of the personal data they have stored about 
you.98 
 
4.2.4 Restrictions on onward transfers 
Another essential element to be assessed is onwards transfers of personal data.99 In order to be 
“essentially equivalent”100 the Chinese framework need to contain restrictions on when personal 
data may be transferred onwards, both for domestic transfers to third parties and transnational 
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an adequate level of protection. This is a must in order to ensure that the data protection level 
won’t be undermined by the transfer and that there is a legal ground for the transfer.  
For domestic transfers, the Standard requires Chinese controllers to conduct a security impact 
assessment in order to assure the safeguard of the personal data to be transferred. As previously 
mentioned, the Chinese framework does not define a processer, and neither does it define a 
“third party” as the GDPR does in Article 4 (10). The same considerations should be asserted 
to the relationship between third parties as with the relationship between controllers and 
processors; the controllers have the ultimate responsibility in accordance with the Chinese 
framework and will have to take responsibility for safeguarding any transfers of personal data. 
So, in order to transfer personal data, Chinese controllers are required to perform a security 
impact assessment, leaving it up to them to decide if the protection offered is sufficient, and 
intimately having to bear the consequences if this turns out to be incorrect.  
 
For transfers outside of the EU, the European framework requires the initial recipient, that being 
the one transferring the personal data onwards, to be responsible for the safeguarding of the 
transfer in the absence of an adequacy decision. Other safeguards can be factors such as a legally 
binding and enforceable instruments, binding corporate rules or contractual clauses etc. that 
assures the data protection of natural persons are not undermined. In specified cases, such 
transfers also require authorization by the competent supervisory authority.101 In other words – 
the GDPR contains strict rules regarding the transfer of personal data outside of the EU. 
 
As already mentioned, the transfer of personal data outside of the EU in accordance with the 
GDPR depends on the level of data adequacy in the recipient country. Thus, it be evaluated 
how the Chinese framework regulates transnational transfers of personal data. 
 
The legal basis for transnational transfers is either the CSL Article 37 and the Standard Article 
8.7. The CSL only applies to “critical information infrastructure operators” that “produce 
personal information or important data”102, meaning that these transfer requirements are not 
applicable to all Chinese data controllers. The main rule in accordance with the CSL is that the 
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are “truly necessary” “due to business requirements”.103 In any case, a security assessment is 
required, in addition to compliance with any relevant laws or regulations that may apply.  
 
The Standard Article 8.7 has broadened the scope of application to all “network operators”. 
Equivalent to that of the CSL Article 37, this provision also requires a security assessment and 
compliance with relevant regulations and provisions. The Standard does however not clarify 
the closer criteria of what this assessment consists of. The CAC has released a revised draft of 
“Personal Information Outbound Transfer Security Assessment Measures” (the Measures) the 
latest draft issued in June 2019. It aims to clarify the requirements of such security assessments. 
The main elements of these provisions are that organizations are to present transfer security 
assessments to the provincial-level cybersecurity and informatization department.104 This 
assessment shall contain a declaration form, the contract entered into between the operator and 
the recipient, an analysis report on the security risk associated with the transfer, as well as other 
materials that will be required by national cybersecurity and informatization departments.105 
This shows that in many instances, a self-assessment consisting of said criteria will suffice to 
conduct a security assessment for transnational transfers in accordance with the Chinese 
framework. The Measures do however contain a provision enabling the relevant cyberspace 
and informatization department to terminate transnational transfers if:  
 
“1. Network operators or recipients experience incidents or relatively serious data breach or 
abuse; 
2. It is impossible or difficult for the data subjects of the personal information to defend their 
legitimate rights or interests; 
3. The network operators or recipients are incapable of safeguarding the security of personal 
information.”106 
 
The above-mentioned provisions show that the main rule is that transnational transfers can be 
conducted in accordance with the Chinese framework when a security assessment has been 
conducted. Exceptions are made in instances mentioned above, where CAC has the authority 
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more responsibility affiliated with evaluating the protection provided by third parties. This 
includes conducting the security impact assessment and making sure that appropriate 
safeguards are in place before a transfer can take place. As opposed to the GDPR where there 
are more stringent requirements that need to be met in order for a lawful transfer out of the EU.  
However, the Measures regarding cross-border transfers helps elucidate how transnational 
transfers are regulated in China, but it is conceivable that more stringent conditions for such 
transfers would be necessary in order to reach an adequacy decision. Companies can more 
easily emphasize self-interests and profit when they conduct the impact assessments 
themselves, which would undermine the data subjects’ rights.   
 
4.2.5 Specific safeguards for special categories of data 
An additional element of significance is whether the Chinese framework offers specific 
safeguards for special categories of data, focusing on sensitive data in particular. The term 
“sensitive data” has already been defined in subsection 4.2.1, as it  has been established that the 
term also covers what is referred to as “personal sensitive information” in the Chinese 
framework.107  
 
The GDPR Article 9 (1) establishes a main rule where processing of sensitive data is prohibited. 
Paragraph 2 further presents ten exceptions where processing may still find place, including (a) 
implicit consent by the data subject, (b) where the processing is necessary in order to carry out 
certain obligations, (c) to protect the vital interest of the data subject or another natural person, 
(i) and (j) for reasons of public interest and more. The list presented is exhaustive, meaning that 
all sensitive data not included in these definitions are prohibited to process.108 The essence is 
that for the Chinese framework to be essentially equivalent, special grounds of lawful 
processing of sensitive data are required. The grounds should be more stringent than those for 
processing regular personal data in order to better assure their safeguarding.  
 
The Standard requires explicit consent when processing sensitive data.109 Implied consent is as 
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suffice as a legal ground for processing sensitive data. In addition, a controller should inform 
the data subject of the functions of the sensitive data collection and explain the impact a refusal 
of consent will have. Special requirements are also imposed on the processing of sensitive data 
regarding a child, including the requirement of explicit consent by a guardian for any child 
below the age of 14.110 
 
The fact that the Standard contains specific requirements for processing of sensitive data is 
good news when it comes to the possibility of an adequacy decision. This category of personal 
data is especially protected by the GDPR, and thus these rights must also be guaranteed an 
adequate level of protection in any third country where an adequacy decision is to be 
considered. Seen in relation with the fact that the Chinse framework through the Standard 
contains a very broad definition of sensitive data (see subsection 4.2.1). This indicates that the 
level of protection of sensitive data in China may even be stronger than that of the GDPR.  
 
4.2.6 Obligations in case of security breaches 
Another characteristic of interest when assessing the adequacy level is the difference in 
obligations arising from the two different frameworks regarding security breaches. According 
to the provisions of the CLS, network operators are required to notify both network users and 
report to the competent authorities as soon as possible after a breach has occurred or potentially 
will. The Standard helps provide more in-depth provisions regarding the obligations network 
operators are submitted to. This includes requirements to formulate response plans in regard to 
possible security breaches in the future, and no less than annual response training for staff. In 
the event of a breach a controller is also required to record relevant information, including the 
amount of effected information, individuals etc.111 
 
Data controllers subjected to the GDPR shall “without undue delay” notify the competent 
supervisory authority and communicate to the affected data subjects in the event of a data 




110 The Standard Article 5.5 a), b) and c) 
111 Ibid. Article 9.1 
112 GDPR Articles 33 (1) and 34 (1) 
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these elements to the relevant authority and subjects, correspondingly to reaction required by 
the GDPR.113  
 
One issue in the Chinese framework is that it is not specified which exact authorities to report 
to. The CSL Article 42 states that in the event of a “leak, destruction, or loss of personal 
information”, network operators are to “make a report to the competent departments in 
accordance with regulations”. The CLS does however not specify how to identify the competent 
authorities, leaving it uncertain for operators where to report. This is in contrast to the GDPR 
which specifies that breaches should be notified “to the supervisory authority competent in 
accordance with Article 55”.114 Article 55 contains the legal basis for national supervisory 
authorities, indicating that reports are to be made to the national supervision authority in the 
relevant Member State.   
 
In 2017 CAC released a supporting regulation named “the National Cybersecurity Incident 
Response Plan” (the Plan). It aims to clarify which authorities within China the breaches are to 
be reported to. In the Plan, data breaches, which is referred to as incidents, are divided into the 
four sub-categories: general, relatively significant, significant and extraordinarily significant, 
from the least to the most serious. The contents of this plan will not be examined closely, but 
what is relevant relating to this question, is the fact that it puts CAC in charge of coordinating 
other relevant government authorities regarding the handling of what they call “Cybersecurity 
Incidents”, meaning data breaches. In addition, the translations of the Plan point out that the 
authorities are to be divided into specific sectors as well as geographical jurisdictions, where 
they will be responsible to handle data breaches within this jurisdiction.115 
 
Recent procedure has also shown that the CAC has taken the main role of enforcing the CSL 
and data protection laws in China in general. The content of the Plan seems to support this 
notion of the CAC as a senior authority regarding supervision and enforcement of the Chinese 





113 The Standard Articles 9.1 and 9.2 
114 GDPR Article 33 (1) 
115 CMS, “China publishes the National Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan” 
116 WP 254rev.01 Chapter 3 
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4.2.7 Appointment of Data Protection Officer 
In short, a Data Protection Officer (DPO) is someone who oversees a company’s data protection 
strategy and GDPR compliance.117 The GDPR requires the appointment of a DPO in any case 
where (a) processing is carried out by a public authority, (b) the core activity of a controller or 
processor requires a regular and systematic monitoring on a large scale or (c) when the core 
activities of the controller processor consist of processing a large scale of special categories of 
data [sensitive data].118  
 
In accordance with condition (b) and (c), the appointment of a DPO is based on whether the 
organization process a “large scale” of data, not the size of the organization itself. There are 
however no provisions providing a more specific number or guidelines clarifying when 
processing is said to be considered at a large scale. Even the relevant guidelines for data 
protection officers released by the WP 29 is unable to give a concrete number for when this 
requirement was met.119   
 
The Standard on the other hand, presents precise numbers for when Chinese companies are 
required to appoint DPO’s. This includes when “the number of employees exceeds 200” or 
when personal data “of more than 500,000 people” is processed or expected to be processed 
within 12 months.120 The Chinese framework seems to make it easier to companies to comply 
as they are given concrete numbers to relate to, while the GDPR is more flexible in its 
appointment of a DPO with a term that can be dynamic and develop with time. 
 
Also, as evident in the GDPR Article 37 (1) (a), a DPO appointment is required when the 
processing is to be carried out by a “public authority or body” in accordance with the GDPR 
Article 37 (1). This is essential to prevent abuse of power and to assure effective protection 
against surveillance by public authorities. A corresponding provision is not found in the Chinese 
framework, which is a problem in connection to an adequacy assessment as this makes it easier 
for public authorities to access personal data, depriving data subjects of additional protection 




117 GDPR Recital 97 
118 Ibid. Article 37 (1) 
119 WP 243 rev.01, para. 3.2.1 




Even with the differences found in the Chinese framework, there are a lot of similarities 
indicating that the adoption of an adequacy decision may very well be a tangible possibility. 
Especially as at seems as if the Standard is mirrored after the GDPR to a large extent. It is 
interesting to see that some of the differences that presents themselves show that some of the 
provisions of the Standard presents stricter requirements than that of the GDPR, especially as 
Europeans tend to have a conception of their data protection laws being the strictest and most 
extensive.  
 
Looking at the Japanese decision, the framework present in Japan at the time leading up to the 
adoption was not deemed to be adequate. They implemented changes to their data protection 
legislation as the adequacy decision went into effect, to make sure their frameworks were 
harmonized. This could also be a possibility for China if it was found that there were still 
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5. Enforcement and compliance mechanisms 
In addition to having a legal framework which ensures a level of adequate protection, there are 
requirements regarding the enforcement and compliance mechanisms that need to be in place 
in order for a third country to offer an adequate level of protection. in accordance with the 
GDPR Article 45 and the other criteria mentioned in subsection 3.2.1. These mechanisms make 
up the second half of the adequacy assessment. This section will provide a brief review of the 
relevant elements with respect to the Chinese framework, followed by additional elements of 
relevance.  
 
5.1 Supervision, compliance and accountability 
The GDPR does not only require the existence of independent supervisory authorities, but 
furthermore that they are “effective functioning”.122 Meaning that their mere existence is not 
sufficient to meet the requirements, they must perform their tasks by providing a fair and 
legitimate implementation.  
 
As the Standard is a voluntary Standard, it cannot be enforced in the same sense as the GDPR 
can. It is hard to carry out supervision activities for a set of guidelines that are not compulsory. 
The CSL does however contain provision regarding supervision, with Article 8 stating that 
different state departments are to plan and coordinate “cybersecurity efforts and related 
supervision and management efforts”. Regardless, most of the relevant provisions that make 
the Chinese framework harmonize with the GDPR, are found in the Standard. It will therefore 
be decisive in an adequacy assessment whether or not the existence of supervision authorities 
who can enforce the provisions of the Standard exist.  
 
Although CAC has shown that it will reprimand companies not in compliance with the 
provisions of the Standard, the supervisory system is not legally established or consistent in the 
sense of the EU system. On one hand, this indicates that China has a long way to go regarding 
data protection supervision. On the other hand, the practice of CAC display that the Chinese 
system in its own way has found a way to conduct supervision. It seems that lack of compliance 
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other necessary measures in order to safeguard cybersecurity/personal data in the CSL Article 
10.123 
 
It’s difficult to ensure compliance and accountability when there is a lack of a system to ensure 
properly functioning supervision. The Chinese framework has been known to contain many 
different institutions all having different responsibilities in regard to supervision and 
organization. A very complex data protection system can be difficult f to follow for both data 
controllers and subjects. The system does however seem to be getting better established, with 
CAC taking the leading supervision role and organizing subordinate institutions. A continued 
development in this direction is promising in relation to a possible future adequacy assessment.  
 
A complicated matter is however that GDPR Article 45 (2) (b) also requires the supervisory 
authorities to be “independent”. This is further specified in Article 52 stating for one that they 
“shall act with complete independence in performing its tasks” and also “remain free from 
external influence”124. Without conducting an in-depth deliberation on this section, it is a 
problem that the CAC conducts audits (‘interviews’), gives punishment and other supervisory 
activity as it reports to the “Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission”, which is headed by the 
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping himself. The CAC will accordantly not pass the 
independence-test presented in the GDPR. 
 
5.2 Additional elements 
In addition to the criteria set out in Article 45, the Communication125 has set out four additional 
elements to take into consideration during an adequacy assessment, as briefly mentioned in 
section 3.2.1. 
 
5.2.1 Commercial relationship  
First of all, “the extent of the EU’s (actual or potential) commercial relationship with a given 
third country, including the existence of a free trade agreement or ongoing negotiations”126 




123Zhang and Yin (2019) 
124 Ibid. Article 52 (1) and (2) 
125 The Directorate-General for Communication (the Communication) is the Commissions departments 
responsible for explaining EU policies to outside audiences.   
126 EC MEMO/17/15 
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second largest trading partner with daily trade estimated to be 1 billion EURO, see section 1.2.2. 
Currently negotiating a comprehensive investment agreement aiming to replace the individual 
investment treaties between China and member states. The next round of negotiations is to take 
place in Brussels in the week of 16th of December this year.127 This showcase a strong 
commercial relationship which indicated a need for a safe and efficient way of transferring 
personal data, such as an adequacy decision. 
 
5.2.2 The extent of personal data flows 
The Communication further states that “the extent of personal data flows from the EU, 
reflecting geographical and/or cultural ties” shall be attributed importance.128 There are no 
prominent geographical or cultural ties. Due to the amount of trade between China and EU and 
the big tech industry in China, it is however presumed that large flows of personal data are 
exchanged. The significance of a large amount of personal data exchanged is, as mentioned in 
the beginning of the thesis, indicates that an act on data adequacy would be valuable as it would 
facilitate the workload associated with transfers to third countries, promoting easier trade and 
cooperation.   
 
5.2.3 China’s role in the field of privacy and data protection 
The “pioneering role the third country plays in the field of privacy and data protection that could 
serve as a model for other countries in its region” should also be assessed, and in the case of 
the country holding such a pioneering role, this should be an incentive to work towards an 
adequacy decision.129  
 
It is known that China does not have a good reputation internationally when it comes to privacy 
and data protection. There are constant talks about the government’s mass surveillance such as 
the newly implemented social credit system. In addition, the tendency seems to be that public 
authorities can circumvent any data protection provision in the name of national security. Some 
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First of all, the National Intelligence Law of 2017 has led to concerns globally as it forces 
Chinese companies to hand over personal data to the Chinese government. Article 7 states that 
“all organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence 
efforts”. The Article has been criticized as it among other things encourage citizens to spy on 
each other.  
 
What is to be regarded as “national intelligence efforts” is not clearly defined, and it seems to 
be a term the government choose to interpret as it please. A major problem with this law is that 
regardless of the legal framework and additional safety measures implemented in order to 
ensure adequate protection while transferring to China, a company can still be forced into 
sharing this personal data with the government on the pretense that it is necessary for national 
security efforts. This has for example been a major concern in relation to the implantation of 
Huawei’s 5G network, resulting in countries such as the United States and Australia to block 
the company´s involvement in 5G networks. The concerns are that Huawei may be used to spy 
on data subjects pursuant to the National Security Law, making it a security risk to enter into 
contract with the company regardless of the undertaken safeguards. There has yet to be an EU 
decision on the matter, but a joint risk assessment report of 5G network security was released 
as late as in October this year. The report was developed by the Member States and with support 
from the Commission and the European Agency for Cybersecurity.130 
 
In addition, a new set of guidelines referred to as MLPS 2.0 is to go into effect in China by the 
end of 2019. It includes three new guidelines that has sparked concerns internationally as it 
seems to be applicable to foreign owned companies operating in China and all data saved on 
servers within China.131 One of the more important consequences of these new guidelines is 
that trade secrets will be subject to their application. Any “secrets” can automatically become 
available to the Chinese government, including government owned competitors and even the 
Chinese military.132  
 
The CSL also includes a similar provision, requiring “any person or organization using 




130 EC, “EU-wide coordinated risk assessment of 5G networks security”  
131 BG/T 22239 – 2019; BG/T 25070 – 2019; BG/T 28448 – 2019 
132 China Law Blog, “China´s New Cybersecurity Program: NO place left to hide”  
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national honor, and national interests;”.133 It is presumed that to withhold personal data upon 
public authorities request could statute a breach of this duty. 
 
Such provisions are problematic as they can be used by the public authorities to circumvent 
data protection provision and accordingly undermining the rights of data subjects. It also 
showcases that public authorities are not held to the same standard as organizations when it 
comes to data protection compliance. In accordance with GDPR Article 45 (1) a), whether 
public authorities have access to personal data is an element of the adequacy decision. The fact 
that this was essential for an adequacy decision became apparent in Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner. This is essential for the effective safeguard of personal data and consequently 
data adequacy.  
 
5.2.4 The overall political relationship with China 
Lastly, “the overall political relationship with the third country in question, in particular with 
respect to the promotion of common values and shared objectives at international level” should 
be included in the adequacy assessment.134 As already mentioned, China is an important 
commercial partner for EU, but there has also been substantial political tension between the 
parties throughout the years. The system of government in China differs to the ones prominent 
within the EU member states, and China holds different views on important values such as 
democracy and the principle of popular sovereignty.  
 
Yet, an annual EU-China summit is being held every year to discuss the political and economic 
relationship between the parties. Despite the differences mentioned above, this demonstrates 
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Finally, this section will briefly summarize the above assessment and elucidate the chances that 
the Chinese data protection framework can be deemed “essentially equivalent”135 in accordance 
with the GDPR Article 45 and Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner? In other words; how 
realistic the possibilities of an adequacy decision adopted on China are.  
 
The legal framework concerning data protection in China is in fast development and is making 
progress towards an adequate level of protection in accordance with the GDPR Article 45. As 
showcased in section 4, Chinese data protection framework has many similarities with the 
GDPR, even offering more stringent rules regarding important elements such as processing of 
sensitive data. The adoption of the adequacy decision on Japan demonstrated how minor 
differences in the legal framework in the third country will not necessarily dismiss the chance 
of the adoption of an adequacy decision. In the event of future talks regarding an adequacy 
decision, it would be a possibility for China to make amendments to their existing framework 
to assure compliance with the GDPR, as Japan did by implementing new legislation 
simultaneously as the implementation of the adequacy decision. 
 
As the portrayal has shown, the Chinese framework has been complex making it difficult to 
navigate both relevant provisions and the responsible authorities. Evidently, this has improved 
during the past couple of years with the introduction of CSL and the Standard, in addition to 
improving the coordination of supervision authorities subordinated CAC.  
 
However, the lack of safeguards preventing public authorities from having the opportunity to 
gain access to personal data on a general basis constitutes an obstacle in relation to the 
possibility of an adequacy decision on China. Making sure such safeguards exist and are 
effectively enforced is not only a criterion in accordance with GDPR Article 45 (2) (a), but was 
proved to be a crucial element in order for an adequacy decision to be valid in accordance with 
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